Transcript
Kaeden Thomas: Welcome, welcome, welcome. Welcome to the Full Extent Podcast. I’m your host. Kaeden Thomas, on this space, I talk with University of Utah professors to explore current events. These academics provide myself and the listener in depth and well informed access to the happenings of the world around us. Popular media outlets only give brief snapshots into current events, whereas here we try and fully explore these current events in their totality. Today we are discussing the protests in Iran sparked by a steep economic downturn and the devaluation of the Riyadh, the national currency, there’s been 40% inflation rates with common items now unaffordable to the common man. Sanctions and government efficiency have led to this staunch economic downturn. In response to the protests, the Iranian theocracy has pledged a $7 stipend to each household, which in turn made the protesters even more angry at the negligible amount of money that they’re being provided by the government to put a band aid on an open wound. Death tolls have risen, making this the most one of the most violent protests in Iranian recent history. I don’t know all the facts, but I do know that Alborz Ghandehari does. He is an assistant professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Utah. He has a PhD in ethnic studies that he obtained from the University of California San Diego. His research is conducted on social movements within Iran and Southwest Asia, North Africa, as well as movements within these regions, diasporas. He is the author of the new book, post revolutionary conditions, renewed visions of the Iranian freedom struggle, published in 2025 he is also former coordinator of the use diversity Scholars Program, which centers community empowerment In higher education. So welcome Professor.
Alborz Ghandehari: Thank you for having me.
Kaeden Thomas: So, as we’ve seen in most recent history, you know, there’s been cross cutting movements around and within Iran, with the Mahsa Amini movement of 2022 the women’s life and freedom movement of 2023 and, you know, going way back the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and it being sort of the epitome of this diasporic resistance to authoritarianism against the Shah with millions on the street. So could you walk me through some of the history behind intersectional protests within Iran. How these movements progressed and how they become have they become more cross cutting as they have progressed?
Alborz Ghandehari: Yeah, absolutely. Well, first of all, thanks so much for having me Kaeden, and it really means a lot to our community, to people in Iran and Iranians in the diaspora, that folks are really shedding light on what’s happening on the movement for freedom and justice in Iran. So really appreciate the opportunity to talk with you. So just a little bit of a little bit of history. You know, Iranians have been resisting for freedom from domestic authoritarianism and foreign imperialism for over 100 years, whether it’s been under the previous monarchies that Iran has been ruled by or the current oppressive Islamic Republic. And so, you know, Iranians are really no strangers to mass civil resistance and to really mobilizing to fight for freedom and social justice on a variety of different fronts, and under the Islamic Republic which came to power in 1979 there was a revolution, a very broad based popular revolution in Iran against the authoritarian monarchy of the Pahlavi Dynasty. And, you know, people wanted different forms of social justice and democratic governance. And what happened, of course, was that that revolution you had resulted in the coming to power of Ayatollah Khomeini. And the Islamic clergy, which instituted a new dictatorship in Iran, the Islamic Republic. And so we’ve been seeing time and again ever since those early days where where this new oppressive regime took power. Up until today, as we speak, people coming together time and time again to resist the Islamic Republic’s authoritarianism, its repression, its, you know, political repression and social injustices along class, gender and ethnic lines, and to really win a democratic future for themselves and for people in their country. And so you asked a little bit about how, since when have these protests, kind of movements, taken on an intersectional nature, right, in terms of the fact that are we seeing sort of people coming together around a variety of different issues, whether that’s gender injustice, whether that’s economic injustice, whether that is freedom and social justice for different ethnic minorities, or what some people call national minorities in Iran, like the Kurdish community, the Baluch community, and so on and so forth. And the answer to your question is that while throughout history, throughout the you know this roughly a century or so where Iran has witnessed successive revolutions, uprisings, movements, there have always been, for example, women in these historical uprisings and revolutions, and they have had impact on on these movements, however, oftentimes, historically, whether it was in the 1979 revolution or the 1905 constitutional revolution against the Qajar monarchy, and you know that that sought to establish democratic reforms within Iran, right, whether it was in either of those revolutions or other movements historically, the voices of women were often sidelined, marginalized, and particularly in the 79′ revolution. You know, when it became clear that the Islamic Republic after 1979 was instituting, you know, laws and policies that were very much institutionalizing oppression of women and and taking away women’s rights you had in those immediate days after, you know, the Shah of Iran left the country, people, you know, leaders of different, different movements, not all, but saying, We can’t talk about gender right now. We can’t talk about these issues. We have to be united. And so oftentimes, as I mentioned, right, those voices were sidelined, but they continue to they continue to exist. Women continue to organize and really mobilize their communities. So one of the first examples of that was the mark. You know, one of the first examples in sort of the era of the Islamic Republic was a march 1979 women’s uprising where 15,000 people, mostly women, took the streets, took over the streets of Tehran, and they were, you know, they were opposing and really resisting Khomeini’s institution of or a decree that Khomeini had made right, a decree that he had made calling on women who work in government offices to observe the religious dress code, Islamic religious dress code of hijab, or covering of the head and of the body with loose clothing. And this, he was saying, this is a decree that is compulsory for all women in government offices at that time. And then, of course, that law became a law for all women in the nation, not just women in government offices, but for all women in the nation that they had to by a matter of law, where Islamic hijab and these women on those you know those early days, right after Khomeini had taken power, said, No, we, we do not believe that hijab should be compulsory. Hijab is a religious matter. That is the personal choice, depending on how that person. Wishes to practice their religion, and it should be a personal choice among among, among people, right? And so that protest, we always have to look at that as really an intersectional feminist uprising that happened in Iran, because a lot of these women were also saying one of the chants from that uprising in March of 1979 was, you know, “we did not make a revolution in order to move backwards”, right? So what many of these women who were chanting that were saying, was, we just revolted against one dictatorship, right, which was the dictatorship of the Pahlavi monarchy, which had been backed by the United States. And you know that was, of course, a monarchy that had been put in power in many ways by the United States after they overthrew a democratically elected leader, Prime Minister in Iran and in the early 1950s Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who had actually passed reforms to make the governing structures of Iran’s political system more democratic. You know, the US had and Britain had been angered by by his reforms, he had also nationalized Iran’s oil industry, taking, you know, kicking the British, private, British company that had been profiting off of Iran’s oil, kicking them out of the country, right? So, of course, this leader, Mosaddegh in the 1950s had angered, you know, the US and Britain and so they, you know, led this overthrow, this covert coup d’etat against Mossadegh, against that leader, and brought back the Shah and restored him to absolute power. So it was another dictatorship. So I know I’m getting in the weeds of the history. But going back to the women’s uprising right of 1979 right, what many of those women chanted was, we did not, you know, carry out this revolution against the previous dictatorship in order to have a new dictatorship repressing our rights now in the name of religion. And it’s really important right to look at that and not forget the history of both, how people in Iran have been fighting domestic authoritarianism, domestic despotism and and fighting, you know, foreign imperial powers and often getting attacked between both, both of these forces, right? So, you know, just to kind of briefly, sort of wrap up answering your question about intersectionality, right? You know, since that uprising of 1979 we’ve seen the ways in which particularly women leaders, whether it’s in labor unions, in different feminist grassroots, feminist collectives, in different civil society organizations among you know, national minorities in Iran, how women have really brought gender to the forefront of the struggle for freedom, the struggle for democracy. And you know, the one of the sort of most clear examples of that was the woman life freedom uprising of 2022 and just to correct you earlier, that uprising didn’t happen in 2023 but started in 2022 and went into 2023 gotcha, yeah, and and where it was really led by women at the forefront, and who were saying that we need to fight for all forms of justice, whether it’s gender justice, you know, the rights of workers and working class people, whether it’s the rights of national minorities, we need to all come together, because that’s the only way that true democracy can happen, is through seeing how all of our our struggles intersect. And just you know, the the kind of Last example that I’ll give is that the woman life, freedom uprising was sparked by the killing that the death in custody, what many believe is the killing of Mahsa Gina Amini, as you mentioned, at the hands of Iran’s, you know, police force known as the guidance patrol, which is tasked with policing one of the things it’s tasked with is policing women’s dress code. And you know that that death in custody really sparked this uprising and massah. Gina Amini was also from a Kurdish family, so Kurdish communities were really at the forefront of this uprising as well, talking about their struggle as a marginalized community within Iran, fighting also for the right to teach and learn and publish in the Kurdish language, which is a language that is repressed in Iran, and at the same time fighting for women’s rights and for gender justice.
Kaeden Thomas: Yeah, 100% and so yeah. I mean, like with the most recent protests, it really speaks to the success and efficacy of these feminist grassroots movements, that they’ve come to the forefront of these protests. I appreciate you for correcting me on that. I believed that Mahsa Amini protest was something distinct from the WLF, but it seems to be just carried into the WLF. And so I think this this goes perfectly into my next question. So as you said, the Iranian marginalized community is often overlooked in many instances, both within Iran and by the international community. What were your intentions in choosing to highlight this often sidelined resistance movement?
Alborz Ghandehari: Yeah, thanks for that question. So there’s a lot of different marginalized communities in Iran, and I think one thing to note is that most of the society is really fed up with the current government the Islamic Republic, and the Islamic Republic has lost, you know, all legitimacy among a majority of Iranian society, regardless of gender, regardless of whether you know You’re working class or middle class, regardless of ethnic background. I mean, so it’s really important to note that the reason these uprisings keep happening in Iran, like we’re currently seeing, right? This is not the first time there’s been a nationwide uprising. Just even in the last eight years, there’s been four nationwide uprisings, and the reason for that is because there is a broad based rejection of the ruling system and a desire to build a different kind of political system in Iran, a more democratic political system. So that’s just one point to to really emphasize. But within Iranian society, there are different communities that have been marginalized in different ways. So we talked about, of course, women. We talked about gender injustice. And how, you know, people have been protesting state sponsored gender injustice in areas of family law, of you know, civil rights, of policing, of women’s bodies, labor and other issues. But we’ve also seen that there are different communities, you know, in Iran. Well, let me actually kind of backtrack. I want to talk about three things. So first was gender. I also want to talk about the economic aspect and class. And then I want to talk about ethnicity. So in terms of the economic aspect of these uprisings. So this current uprising, you know, was sparked by a sharp fall in the value of Iran’s currency, and that was due to, you know, US sanctions and how they really have caused the currency to fall. However, it’s important to not just stop the story there, because it’s not simply about sanctions, but it’s actually very much about the Iranian State’s own economic policies over over the last several decades that have really produced a grossly unequal domestic economy and so you know, you’ve had over the last several decades, the Iranian government pursue policies that have privatized massive sections of different industries, meaning that formerly public or state owned industries, whether it was in oil, gas, telecommunications and so on, have been sold by the state to entities that some call parastatal entities, whether they’re linked to the Revolutionary Guard, an elite section of the military. Sometimes these entities are linked to other other state foundations and agencies, and really, these entities, by right, have bought large shares of these industries and have profited immensely from from these industries. And so what you have in Iran is the creation of this very wealthy domestic economic elite that is linked, you know, to state entities, particularly in the military and other entities, right. Who, when everyday Iranians see kind of how these entities are continuing to grow wealthy in spite of US sanctions and these you know this domestic economic elite is is actually growing richer in spite of US sanctions, everyday people get very angry, right? They see their savings plummet, right? The inflation that happens as a result of the currency’s value falling means that your everyday Iranians bank account, their savings are plummeting, right? And so it’s not simply about the impact of US sanctions, which, of course, you know that exacerbates the hardships that everyday Iranians face, but it’s also about how this state has really overseen huge, huge gap between rich and poor and and the creation of this domestic economic elite whose holdings are not taxed are not, you know, transparent, even to the public eye. And you know, and there’s no effort by the state to really substantively Redistribute. You know, wealth and economic resources to mitigate the pain that that working class and middle class Iranians are facing. And so this has created a lot of anger and resentment at the regime by people, you know, among people in the society. So there is the gender aspect, there’s the class aspect or economic aspect, but there’s also, you know, an aspect around ethnic politics that’s really important to pay attention to, and another sort of source of fury among certain marginalized communities, communities within Iran. And so one thing to note is that Iran is a ethnically and linguistically diverse country, between 40 to 60% depending on you know, the study you’re looking at of the population is Persian, of Persian ethnic background, and Persian speaking primarily, whereas the rest of the society is made up of other ethnic groups, what people call national minorities, and that includes Kurdish people, Baluch people, Azerbaijanis, lore people, Arab Iranian community and so on. And oftentimes, these communities are, you know, the highest numbers of people from these communities live in the peripheral reaches of the country. And so, you know, historically successive regimes in Iran, whether it was the Pahlavi monarchy previously or the current Islamic Republic, have really focused economic development in this, usually in the center of the country, which has a higher population of Persian communities. And so this kind of economic development, you know, of development of industry, of economic resources, really did not reach to the extent that it was being developed in the center of the country, did not reach these other communities on the, you know, in the peripheral reaches of the country. And, you know, some people call this sort of organized abandonment, the organized abandonment, or neglect, of non Persian communities within, within Iran and so, you know, and that has really had, again, this is something that has been present historically. And the Islamic Republic really continued these kinds of policies of of of, you know, economic development within the center, exploitation of the lands and resources of the periphery. You know, organized abandonment of the periphery. And so when we’re looking at Kurdish communities, Baluch communities, Arab communities in these areas, right, they are oftentimes dealing with higher levels of poverty, higher levels of of lack, you know, of health care and higher levels of unemployment. And so there’s really a way in which the economic hardships that most Iranians are facing are even more compounded for these minorities. And so that’s why in some of the most recent uprisings in Iran, whether it was the woman life freedom uprising or this current uprising, we’re seeing a lot of protests from from these communities, particularly, you know, the woman life freedom uprising, the Baluch and Kurdish and lower communities were very much at the forefront as we’re, as we’re some other communities in this uprising, we’ve seen that as well. You know, there was a lot of protest activity in in Kurdistan and in, you know, the province of Elam and other places. And so that is another source right of of people’s fury at the Islamic Republic for continuing these sorts of ethnic inequalities, which are, of course, interlocking with the economic inequalities and on top of that, right? People in these communities are repressed if they want to even teach, you know, their children in their own language, as opposed to Persian, you know. And so that’s another important aspect of these protests. And beyond that, you know, in terms of, you know, just like everywhere else, right, marginalized communities are often bearing the brunt and not being seen within the movement, but continue to be present. You know, I think it’s really important to highlight the struggles of LGBTQ people in Iran, and how, in recent years, we’ve really seen how civil society organizations, civil resistance groups, have come together and condemned the Iranian state for criminalizing, you know, queer people, and have really called for the decriminalization and official recognition of LGBTQ people in the community, you know, in Iran and for their rights, in spite of the fact that this is, of course, something that you know, different parts of the society continue to regard as shameful and as something that needs to not be talked about, we’ve really seen how the movement has really met, made headway and changed a lot of attitudes around queer people’s rights in Iran. You know, this is a country where homosexuality, you know, particularly gay men’s homosexuality, is punishable by death. Of course, you know, there’s ways in which queer communities still exist in Iran and are able to survive. But there is that oppression that that is, you know, also really seen in the state’s own, not just criminalization, but complete, you know, disregard for the value of queer people’s lives, and so it’s really important that within the movement, within civil resistance groups and organizations on the ground that this attitude to really support queer people struggles also exists and is growing, absolutely.
Kaeden Thomas: Thank you for that response. I think it’s important, you know, to note that you know all of these things, economic disparities, were fought for during the Iranian Revolution, and we’re not seen to fruition, right? And so a lot of these people are just frustrated with the outcome of of you know, their pushback along the regime,
Alborz Ghandehari: If I could just, yeah, just kind of respond to your point there is that I think that the ’79 revolution was a revolution against the authoritarianism and political repression of the Shah, yeah, and against us, you know, meddling in Iranian affairs. And so there was a way in which all of these other issues around gender, specifically, were erased and were sidelined, even though people brought those up, you know, queer rights were, of course, not even you know, part of the discussion during the Iranian Revolution, which, of course, you know, that’s not just unique to Iran. There are many parts of the world that, even in the in the 1970s you know, still regarded queerness and and LGBTQ people with with a, you know, as shameful kind of identities, and attach shame to those communities, right? And so I think what really we’ve seen, what I follow a lot in my research is how, since the 79′ revolution, there’s really been a concerted effort among people in Iran to both engage with, you know, what were the lessons that we can learn from that revolution? What? What did people want in that revolution? What did our ancestors want, our parents generation who fought in that revolution, what did they want and what did they ignore? What were the failures of that revolution? How? How did the experience of that revolution? How can we learn from it to avoid kind of these pitfalls around erasing gender oppression, marginalizing discussion or now understanding or analysis of gender and sexuality in our movements, right? I think that’s been really something that I uplift a lot in my work, is how a segment of the freedom movement in Iran doesn’t so much reject, you know, the kind of, or, let me kind of, kind of say that, let me rephrase that a segment of movement really seeks to engage with the legacy of the revolution, what its failures were, in order to create movements that are that are more oriented around collective liberation, you know, and and really tending to these different issues and intersections that were marginalized and erased in earlier movements like the ’79 revolution, yeah.
Kaeden Thomas: And might I mention a great movie that exemplifies this is Persepolis, which is Iranian family who is communist, who is essentially sunned by the shunned by the Shah and and persecuted for their ideological beliefs. And then they fought in the revolution. And prior or and following the revolution, they were then persecuted as well. So a lot of people didn’t have the, you know, the result wasn’t beneficial to a lot of these people who were involved in the protest itself. Next question would be, you know, we see that, you know, there most recently, you know, in the protests, I don’t know what the exact figure is now, right, because it’s they’re not letting a lot of reporters into the country, and there’s a lot of social media repression, and people can’t really get a gage on what exactly is going on within The Iranian protests. But a lot of people have been killed, and a lot of people have been oppressed by the regime who has cracked down with the IRGC, which is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and other military engagements. What are some sort of unconventional ways that individuals engage in revolutionary action within Iran in response to this, you know, this violent pushback.
Alborz Ghandehari: Yeah, thank you for for that question. So you know, the the Islamic Republic has done what it what it always does, which is respond with high levels of of violence, deadly violence. And it really took that violence to, you know, in recent memory, at least, to new heights in this current uprising where, you know there’s estimates. It’s really hard to know just how high the estimates of killings are, but it’s, it’s very, very disturbing. You’ve, you know, you see human rights organizations that have been reporting at least 2400 protesters have been killed by security forces. Others are saying the number is closer to 3500 but that that should just be understood as an absolute minimum. That you know, these numbers are climbing as people confirm more and more reports. At least 18,000 people have been arrested again, that number can be an undercount as well. And. Um, but one thing that is really clear is that repression does not solve the issue. It does not actually it might crush or quell these movements in the short term, but what we’ve seen time and again is that they come back right the overall, the overall rejection of the ruling authorities and of the of the state continues to exist among broad swathes of the society, among the majority of the society. And so, you know, despite this really brutal repression, these movements are going to continue to exist and to come back. Yes, and then so you asked about what are how do people protest? How do people resist, given these really repressive conditions, and I think we can look to the even just the recent history of these different uprisings that people do not simply accept right being silenced by the state. So when you know, Gina Amini was, was, you know, killed in the custody of the guidance patrol. This was something that was the state had been ramping up enforcement of compulsory veiling. And so many women, you know, across Iran and in the diaspora who’ve lived in Iran have a story of being harassed by authorities, by the police, by the guidance patrol, for you know, how they were wearing their headscarf, and so that you know, and really, there had been violent attacks, I mean, throughout the history of the country, but but in recent memory, where, in 2022 the President, at that time, Ibrahim Raisi, had you know, that the government essentially had passed this decree, or this policy that you know, called for the stepping up of enforcement of compulsory hijab. And this was a response to the fact that women were not abiding by the law, that they were either wearing their hijab very loosely, or they were not wearing it at all. And so these were everyday ways that women were resisting. And of course, it was met by further repression where women were arrested and detained and beaten, in some cases right there was a video that came out. This is all before the woman life, freedom, uprising of sepida rashno, who had been, you know, a woman who had been arrested and detained and clearly beaten because of, you know, by security forces, because of so called. They had alleged that her hijab was improper, right? And so what we saw from that was that that kind of violence did not deter Iranians from coming out on the streets. In fact, it emboldened them. And so when you know Gina Amini was killed, you had masses of people across the country coming out and saying, We do not, we do not just allow something like this to happen, right? And so you had very, you know, creative acts of resistance, whether women were taking off their their headscarf and, you know, burning them in bonfires, or cutting their hair. You know, there was other kinds of kind of artistic protests, people creating songs that would go viral on social media and in the streets to continue to boost people’s courage and hope for that freedom was still worth fighting for. And I should say, right, these acts of resistance are met time and time again by violence, by repression, by arrests, by killings. But it didn’t stop women then, and it didn’t stop them in this current uprising, either. And one of the you know, really, I think important things to to recognize about the woman life, freedom uprising was that while it did not succeed in, you know, bringing about the overthrow of the state, it really was the first time where these different communities. Whether it was national minorities, women, you know, working class communities marked one of the first times in recent memory where all of these communities were rising up together. But also now, nowadays, in Iran, the state doesn’t have the appetite to enforce compulsory veiling, because it knows how people have fought back time and again, and so women are not abiding by the law in large numbers, and are not, you know, veiling, having the headscarf. And I think this is important to see how certain fragments of power, right in these uprisings, fragments of power can be wrested away from the state and taken by the people that are protesting, even if the you know, the overthrow of the state wholesale doesn’t happen, of course, you know, I agree with many, many analysts and researchers, but also movement leaders themselves when they say that the Islamic Republic is, you know, the Islamic Republic’s days are numbered. And the fact that clearly this state has been unable to resolve people’s dissatisfaction, people’s anguish, the crises that people face. And so you know, it will not survive forever. And you know, the uprisings and the movement for freedom will continue until the state is gone.
Kaeden Thomas: Yeah, and I think you know this speaks to, obviously, the lack of authoritarian resilience right now. You know the regime is on its last legs, but does also speaks to the resilience of the protesters to really seek out, you know, what they have been looking for and fighting for equal rights and such. So along these lines, you know, do you think, because there have been, you know, Trump has announced that he has and proclaims that he will assist protesters if violence does occur within or violence does continue against Protesters from the regime. Do you think this, you know, this proclamation from the US, does that hurt, or does that assist the current resistant movements?
Alborz Ghandehari: I think it hurts the resistance movements, and I’ll tell you why. So in this uprising, you know, there’s been an uprisings in the past as well, but really in this uprising, there has been a segment of protesters, both in Iran and in the diaspora, that have been calling for the son of the last Shah and dictator of Iran, and his name. The son’s name is Reza Pahlavi, who lives in the United States, has been living in exile since 1979 there’s been a segment of protesters in Iran and in the diaspora that have been calling for him to be their their leader, and whether that’s to lead them as a new Shah, a new king, or to simply lead a type of transitional program, you know, to replace The Islamic Republic and the US has really been focusing on this segment of protesters. And I want to be clear that while they’re there, this is a absolutely a segment of protesters. It’s no way the majority or there’s really no, no consensus at all whatsoever, around having this person who not only was the son of the last dictator, but who is also very much aligned with the interests of the United States and of Israel, you know, to to be the leader of Iran through, through, a transition to democracy. So the support that exists for Reza Pahlavi is limited. It’s uneven. It’s there. Oftentimes the support that is there comes out of this sense of despair where people don’t see an alternative right, and people are tired. Are, are angry and are really have rightful hatred towards this current regime, the Islamic Republic, that they feel anyone could be better, or if we could, just, you know, any, any form of intervention, just, please save us, right? And so, what I’ve noticed, and what other people who have analyzed Iranian politics have noticed, is that this kind of response among a segment of protesters, again, not the majority, is indicative of that broader despair, rather than a real feeling of alignment or approval of Pahlavi or even of Trump or of Netanyahu and of the State of Israel, right? And so I think that there has been not enough discussion, particularly in Western media and and in the West in general, about civil society groups, a large section of civil society in Iran that has been fighting the Islamic Republic For decades, for years, if not decades that has been, you know, really, you know, fighting in these uprisings to abolish the state and to build a democratic transitional program in Iran at the Same time, right this, this segment of the movement, civil society groups and organized civil resistance groups, has also made known its opposition to the CO optation of Iran’s movement for democracy by foreign powers, chiefly Israel and the United States, you know. And when I say, you know, these, these civil society groups, I’m talking about labor unions. I’m talking about student, student leaders and movements. I’m talking about feminist, grassroots, feminist collectives. I’m talking about protest coordination councils among various communities in Iran, including the Kurdish and Baluch communities and others. I’m talking about retirees and pensioners. You know, there’s a sizable segment, progressive segment, what, again, some people have called civil society right that has come out time and again and said, We’re our struggle is to dismantle the Islamic Republic and bring about democracy. But we also oppose Israel and the United States or any foreign power taking advantage of our movement because we don’t, we simply don’t trust right those powers. We’ve seen the history of US involvement in other countries, as well as our own right, the history of taking out Democratic leaders simply because they go against us, business interests, whether or, you know, European business interests, whether it was British oil interests during the 1950s causing the US and Britain to take out the democratically elected leader Mohammed Mosaddegh in Iran, whether it was, you know, their coup d’etat in Chile and Guatemala, again, similarly democratic elected leaders in the 50s, 60s, 70s, right? And so seeing this kind of history of US involvement really worsening conditions or bringing about another dictatorship, makes this segment weary that US intervention can help also, kind of I think there is a real understanding that when we see someone like Reza Pahlavi, who’s clearly in the corner of Israel and The United States, we have to wonder, right when Israel, for example, which has been conducting a genocide against Palestinians for the last two years, Palestinians in Gaza has, you know, conducted an occupation of the Palestinian people for many decades? And so, how can democracy be brought to Iran by a foreign power that itself is very anti-democratic and really has conducted an occupation and genocide of the Palestinians. Right? How can we trust any person who’s claiming to. Be our leader. Right? For example, padlavi is if he is aligned with the interests of Israel, same with Trump. Right, in the United States, we’re taking part in our own movements against our own country’s slide into authoritarianism. We have ice on the streets of our communities, terrorizing our communities. You know, murdering people like what they did with Renee good, right? How can the leader of this country, right, Donald Trump, who has been so patently anti democratic in our own context, bring democracy to another people. And so I think this skepticism and this opposition among a segment of the movement, and particularly in civil society, against the co-optation of the pro democracy movement in Iran by foreign powers is very real. It cannot be ignored this, this opposition cannot be ignored because I think, you know, the segment of pro Pahlavi protesters, and particularly in the diaspora right, have been calling for, it’s time for unity. We need to all unify behind this person, behind Pahlavi, and this is our best bet to take out the state. But in fact, that unity is very premature, because there is not that consensus whatsoever within the movement itself. And in fact, you have civil resistance leaders who have really put their lives on the line fighting the Islamic Republic. I mean, I’m talking about people who’ve received the death sentence for their organizing, right, people like varishemura D pakshan Azizi, these are Kurdish feminist activists who have been sentenced to death by the Iranian state. Varishemura D’s death sentence was recently overturned, but, you know, she she now needs to go through a retrial, so it’s still unclear, but, you know, people who have been paying a heavy price by organizing against the state, calling for its dismantlement, calling for its overthrow. That are themselves saying, but we also oppose right intervention and co optation by foreign powers that we know to be anti democratic themselves and so, you know, just lastly, to kind of wrap up that point, I think it’s really important that the the issue doesn’t change. You know, the fact that Iranians are done with the Islamic Republic, the fact that Iranians are ready for a new state to replace this oppressive regime with a democratic system. That fact is alive and well. That fact remains. And really what many of these civil resistance leaders and organizations are saying is that it’s up to us to build a revolutionary strategy, build an independent revolutionary strategy among our people, among our communities, to to fight and and succeed in our revolution, to to overthrow this, this state, and really replace it with a democratic program on our own terms.
Kaeden Thomas: Well said, Professor, yeah. And I think you know, just to sort of conclude that segment you know US intervention, as we’ve seen in Venezuela. It’s not rather a democratic transition, as much as it is, you know, foreign imperialism in the modern era, right? And you touched on earlier that, you know, it’s hard to centralize for these, for these, you know, coalescing groups to have centralized their efforts against the regime and and essentially the outcomes of what they want. Right? What do you think it is that these groups have to do in order to consolidate these efforts under one umbrella, in order to have success within the resistance movements.
Alborz Ghandehari: So I think one thing to take note of is that there’s already been a cohesion within civil society within Iranian civil society around a democratic program, democratic transitional program for Iran. And so when we’re talking about, how can we amplify the voices of Iranians, how can we support people and be in solidarity? I think it’s a. Important to pay attention to what civil resistance groups and leaders on the ground have been saying and during the you know, after the 2022 woman life freedom uprising in February of 2023 you had 20 civil society organizations, which included labor unions, feminist collectives, retirees, unions and other groups that came together around an unprecedented 12 point charter for Iran’s future. And that charter included their their demands, and really their, their calls, right, the different items of of change that they were calling for, and that any kind of democratic system that was going to replace the Islamic Republic could really only be democratic if it addressed these different issues. And part of those issues, you know, included right, the the end to censorship of any kind of expression, right, freedom of expression thought, and an end to censorship, you know, an end to political repression, but also other issues such as, you know, an end to gender apartheid and to patriarchal laws, an end to the criminalization of LGBTQ people and their official recognition. There was also one of the points, or few of the points in that charter really had to do with economic issues as well. So economic redistribution, confiscation of wealth from the domestic economic elite, and reinvestment into, you know, people’s livelihoods, infrastructure, the environment, pensions, education, healthcare and so on and so forth. You know, the sharing of power among national, regional and local councils, really thinking about the economic redistribution of resources also to national minorities that have been marginalized as a result of policies of both the Islamic Republic and the previous Pahlavi monarchy. So all of these, you know, points were were raised as this is our charter, when we say freedom, when we say democracy, these are the points of our program that we believe will make a transitional program that is worth fighting for. And so I think the cohesion of civil society around these around this program has been happening since the woman life freedom uprising, and it’s continuing to happen. Right in this uprising, we saw many of those same groups, but also other groups come out and renew similar calls for the realization of the points of these issues right in that charter. So I think that’s really, really important now regarding, you know, the sort of fragmentation within Iranian society broadly, and how there have been efforts to create a coalition or people that might be able to lead a Transitional Council that included Pahlavi and the feminist, you know, activist Shirin Ebadi and others, right, which didn’t go anywhere because of the disagreements, and also because of, I think Pahlavi and his supporters, especially monarchist supporters, that are really in support of bringing monarchy back to Iran, really have insisted that there is only one person that can lead this movement, and that’s our guy, right? That’s Reza Pahlavi. And so that has really created this kind of silencing of other communities, groups, movements within Iran that are also fighting for the abolition of the Islamic Republic, but that do not agree with Pahlavi leadership, that do not agree with what you know his leadership represents, especially given you know his alliance with with Donald Trump. And with Israel, right? And the kind of really horrific practices that those leaders have engaged in against people within their own countries, right, Palestinians and people in the US and so, you know, I think it’s really important when we’re talking about building solidarity. You know, how does cohesion happen within a movement? How is unity built? Unity is built through taking seriously the grievances of particular communities that are fighting alongside you, and so, for example, right? If you don’t want to take seriously when Kurdish civil society groups, Kurdish feminists, you know, Kurdish teachers and others are saying, you know, our community, our parents generation experienced hardship under the monarchy. We don’t believe this man is our leader. We believe we are our own leaders. That you have to take that seriously, right? There’s a reason people are saying that there is a particular historical experience of the marginalization and disenfranchisement of their community that they’re speaking to, right? And of course, you know, and that’s a disenfranchisement that continued under the Islamic Republic. And so these are communities that are very much resisting the state, but we have to pay attention to what they’re saying when they talk about both their past and present experiences with oppression. And so you know when you have, for example, feminist leaders and collectives really calling out Pahlavi for taking the words woman, life, freedom out of his I believe it was his Twitter account or some social media account that he had right. He had had this slogan on his profile, and just during the recent uprising, he took that slogan out. And what many feminist leaders interpreted that to mean is that you never really were standing with the feminist movement. You were using and CO opting, our slogan to among feminists for CO opting, right, their slogans, their demands, their movement, and claiming leadership and erasing the leadership of those very feminist on the ground in Iran. And so, you know, all of that is to say that we need to listen and also to workers, right to labor unions. The, for example, one of the labor unions that has been really active in these uprisings has been the contract oil workers union. These are oil workers who are very precarious. They’re hired under temporary contracts which are hyper exploitative. Unlike other oil workers in Iran that are hired under more official contracts, right? You’ve had this increasing use of really exploitative temporary contracts in the oil sector and in all other a lot of all other sectors in Iran. But you know, so going back to to these oil workers, when they go on strike, you know, and are striking against Not, not just striking for higher wages and better conditions, but are striking in solidarity with nationwide uprisings for the, you know, the abolition of the Islamic Republic, and are playing really important role in their communities. We have to listen to them when they say, we’re not so certain. In fact, we have reason to believe, right that, you know, US and US intervention is really not going to do much for the workers of this country. It’s really not going to do much for the working class people in this country. You know, we’ve seen time and time again, the US install governments that are friendly to its business interests, rather than governments that want to support the welfare and well being of workers and working class people. And so when the contract oil workers or other labor unions, teachers or others say we’re fighting for economic justice as well, and we have reason to believe that this is not the priority of Pahlavi, Israel and the US, then we need to also listen to those communities as well. So all that’s to say is, I think that. But you know, Iranians are very stubborn in their desire for freedom, and we’ve seen this time and time again. They continue to take the streets, they continue to build their movements. They continue to cohere around the alternative that they want. There’s still a lot of, you know, work left to do to really build a strategy for a successful revolution in Iran. But I believe it’s possible. I believe that, you know, civil resistance in Iran believes it’s possible, and that can they can build their independent, you know, movement for self determination, without the co-optation of their movement by foreign powers that are not acting in their interest, but really In the interest of their own geopolitical and economic agendas.
Kaeden Thomas: Yeah, so in short, you know, listen, I think thank you for mentioning Pahlavi is, you know, co-opting, his almost like feminist despotism that he’s used to garner legitimacy. I didn’t know that at all, but I really appreciate you. I think that concludes this segment. Thanks for being the mouse piece for people that really can’t speak out for themselves. I think it’s so important that we have scholars like you really investigating this, these sort of resistance movements and movements for the betterment of of communities and societies.
Alborz Ghandehari: Thank you, Kaeden. And just if I can say one last thing is that people in Iran need solidarity. They need global solidarity from people of conscience around the world. And so there’s a lot of you know, confusion and different narratives out there among you know what to think about what’s happening in Iran, but the number one thing to really understand is that Iranians deserve freedom just like anybody else. They deserve social justice just like anybody else, and they deserve to determine their own path and their own future. And what they have said resoundingly is that they no longer want the Islamic Republic to rule over them, and that they want democracy. And so what we can do, you know, outside of Iran, is to amplify their stories, amplify their perspectives, and not just listen to you know, the you know, kind of discourses among foreign leaders us or Israeli leaders, but really listen to the voices of people on the ground and take action and and and expression and express solidarity with people so that their you know, story doesn’t go unheard in in the global community, correct? Often it is those who are in power that overshadow those who are not.
Kaeden Thomas: Thank you so much for being on with us today, Professor, and I really appreciate your contribution.
Alborz Ghandehari: Thank you for having me.
Kaeden Thomas: Sweet.
Kaeden Thomas: Thank you guys so much for having listened to the end of this podcast. I just wanted to notify you guys that Alborz Ghandehari just published an article on the New Arab called “Neither Khamenei, Trump, nor Shah: Towards a roadmap for democracy in Iran.” If you want to continue furthering your knowledge about the freedom struggle within Iran, I definitely recommend checking it out.